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ARTICLE
TOO LATE IN THE GAME: HOW
BALLOT MEASURES UNDERCUT
CEQA
BY JON RAINWATER* AND SUSAN STEPHENSON**

I. INTRODUCTION

"Take me out to the ball game" recently became the campaign slogan for two critical development projects in San Francisco. Both of these development projects - a San Francisco
Giants ballpark and a San Francisco 4gers football stadium/shopping mall complex - were approved by the voters, in
March, 1996, and June, 1997, respectively, and are now moving
forward.
Because the regulatory guidelines for the California
Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA") contain an exemption for
"the submittal of proposals to a vote of the people," both
projects avoided environmental analysis after the board of
supervisors and the electorate had given a green light for the
projects. In this article, we will examine the possibility that

* Jon Rainwater received his B.A. from the University of California at Berkeley
and currently works as the membership director of the California League of Conservation Voters. He is active in local environmental issues and serves on the board of the
San Francisco League of Conservation Voters.
** Susan Stephenson received her B.A. from the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill and currently works as national organizing director of the Headwaters
Sanctuary Project. She is active in local environmental issues and serves on the board
of San Francisco Tomorrow, an urban environmental organization.
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the ballot measure exemption functions as a loophole that
weakens the goal of early meaningful, analysis that is at the
heart of CEQA.
To. put the exemption in a specific
environmental and political context, we will look at some of the
environmental impacts of the two San Francisco stadium
development projects as well as the campaigns for the
stadiums. For historical context, we will also describe the
origins of the ballot measure exemption and the case law
surrounding it. Finally, we will briefly propose suggestions for
reform.
II. THE CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT
In the early 1970's, as California experienced sustained
economic and population growth, Californians grew concerned
about a host of environmental problems - including traffic
congestion, toxic contamination, decreasing air quality and
water quality, and destruction of open space. Those concerns
in turn led to a series of landmark environmental protection
laws. l The California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA") perhaps the most ambitious of those laws - was passed by the
State Legislature in 1970 to "ensure that the long-term
protection of the environment ... shall be the guiding criterion
in public decision-making.,,2
Modeled on the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA"),3 CEQA requires "local agencies, regional agencies,
and state agencies, boards, and commissions" to take
environmental impacts into consideration in their actions.4
CEQA has been interpreted as "requiring public agencies to
deny approval of a project with significant adverse effects when
feasible alternatives or feasible mitigation measures can

1. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15378(b)(4) (1996) [hereinafter "CEQA Guidelines"]. The "CEQA Guidelines" begin in section 15000 of Title 14 of the California
Code of Regulations.
2. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21001(d) (West 1996).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.
4. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §§ 21000(g), 21001(0, (g) (West 1996 & Supp. 1997). See
CEQA Guidelines, §§ 15002(b), 15020, 15367, 15368, 15369, 15383 (1996).
0
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substantially lessen such effects.'l5 By requiring environmental
concerns to guide development, CEQA revolutionized planning
in California. It set up an open process that would give public
agencies, project proponents, and the public a chance to fully
assess the impact of development projects before approving
them. This process utilizes the Environmental Impact Report
("EIR") as the key tool in environmental decision-making.6 An
.EIR as envisioned in CEQA would contain three main
components: 1) a description of the environmental impacts of a
projece 2) a determination as to whether there are feasible less
environmentally harmful alternatives to the project8 and 3) and
an analysis of ways of mitigating the harmful environmental
effects of the projece.
CEQA Administrative Guidelines10 and case law ll
emphasize that the "EIRs should be done as early in the
planning process as possible to enable environmental
considerations to influence project, program or design.,,12
Courts describe the preparation of EIRs prior to approval of
proposed projects as the "heart of the environmental control
process,,13 and as simply the "heart of CEQA.,,14 In fact,
untimely EIRs have been disapproved of because they can

5. Sierra Club v. Gilroy City Council, 222 Cal. App. 3d 30, 41(1990).
6. See CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21061 (West 1996). Details of the EIR process are
set forth in sections 15080-15096 of Title 14 of the California Administrative Code.
7. See id.
8. See CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21002.1 (a) (West 1996); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14
§ 15121(a). The content requirements for EIRs generally are set forth at §§ 1512015132 of the Administrative Code.
9. See CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21002.1 (a) (West 1996).
10. CEQA Guidelines, § 15004(b).
11. See, e.g., Fullerton Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 654 P.2d
168 (Cal. 1982); Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Com., 529 P.2d 1017 (Cal. 1975);
Stand Tall on Principles v. Shasta Union High Sch. Dist, 235 Cal. App. 3d 772, 780
(1991); Mount Sutro Defense Comm. v. Regents ofUniv. of Cal., 77 Cal. App. 3d 20, 35
(1978).
12. Bozung, 529 P.2d at 1030, n. 7.
13. County ofInyo v. City of Los Angeles, 71 Cal. App. 3d 185, 192 (1977).
14. Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project v. County of Stanislaus, 48 Cal. App. 4th
182, 190 (1996). See also CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 14 § 15003; Citizens of Goleta Valley v.
Board of Supervisors, 801 P.2d 1161 (Cal. 1990); No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 529
P.2d 66 (Cal. 1974); San Franciscans for Reasonable Growth v. City and County of San
Francisco 151 Cal. App. 3d 61, 72 (1984).
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become "post hoc rationalizations" to support action already
taken."15
This requirement of early environmental analysis conflicts
with the single provision in the CEQA Guidelines that exempts
ballot measures. When an EIR is done for an environmentally
sensitive project well after the voters and municipal authorities
have embraced the project, can the EIR really be objective and
timely? Or does the exemption become, especially when project
proponents for financial resources and political clout, a way of
ensuring that EIRs are done "too late in the game" to have
meaningful impact? In these cases, is CEQA's mandate to
"ensure that the long-term protection of the environment ...
shall be the guiding criterion in public decision making" being
circumvented?16
III. REGULATORY BASIS FOR CEQA'S BALLOT
MEASURE EXEMPTION
The original intention of the CEQA exemption for ballot
measures is unclear. The exemption is not found in CEQA's
statutory language, but in the CEQA Guidelines.
The
Guidelines are not part of the statute passed by the
Legislature, but are promulgated by the state Resources
Agency to aid local agencies in implementation of CEQA. The
Guidelines in section 15378(b)(4) - originally adopted as
section 15037 in 1973 - simply state that the "submittal of
proposals to a vote of the people" is not to be considered a
"project" as defined by CEQA and therefore is not subject to the
CEQA review process.
Like all sections of the CEQA
Guidelines, the ballot measure exception is not binding on the
courts, but the Guidelines are generally given "significant
weight."17 The California Supreme Court, however, has held

15. Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 764 P.2d 278
(Cal. 1988). See also, No Oil, 529 P.2d, at 74.
16. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21001(d) (West 1996).
17. Guardians of Turlock's Integrity v. Turlock City Council, 149 Cal. App. 3d 584,
594-595 (1984); City of Santa Ana v. City of Garden Grove, 100 Cal. App. 3d 521, 530
(1979).
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that the Guidelines should not be followed when a provision is
erroneous or clearly unauthorized. 18
The courts have also at times recommended a loose
approach to specific provisions of the CEQA Guidelines, one
where the Guidelines "are subject to a construction of
reasonableness,,19 and are "distinguishable from standards that
frequently require a rigid and precise application . . . [and]
have only general application to the diversity of projects
undertaken or approved by public agencies. »20
Since the CEQA environmental review process only applies
to "projects," this section of the Guidelines suggests the
possibility that ballot measures - including those approving
what would otherwise be a project under CEQA - would be
considered exempt from CEQA and CEQA's environmental
review process. 21
CEQA defmes a "project" as "an activity which may cause
either a direct physical change in the environment, or a
reasonably foreseeable indirect change in the environment.'~2
The "submittal of proposals to a vote of the people of the state
or of a particular community,,23 is found in a short list of
activities that "are not projects" in section 15378 of the CEQA
Guidelines.
This section of the guidelines also excludes from the
definition of project "proposals for legislation to be enacted by
the State Legislature, ,,24 "continuing administrative or
maintenance activities, such as purchases of supplies,
personnel-related actions, general policy and procedure

18. See Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 764 P.2d
278, 282, n. 2 (1988).
19. Rural Landowners Ass'n v. Lodi City Council, 143 Cal. App. 3d 1013, 10211022 (1983).
20. Las Virgenes Homeowners Fed'n, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 177 Cal. App.
3d 300, 306, fn. 1 (1986).
21. See Stein v. City of Santa Monica, 110 Cal. App. 3d 458, 460 (1980).
22. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21065 (West 1996).
23. CEQA Guidelines, § 15378(b)(4).
24. CEQA Guidelines, § 15378(b)(2).
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making,,,25 and "the creation of government funding
mechanisms or other government fiscal activities which do not
involve any commitment to any specific project. 1I26
When read in context, the exceptions made for "not-projects"
seem to be borne out of an effort to avoid encumbering basic
governmental procedures that "do not involve commitment to
any specific [development] project" by the CEQA review
process. The CEQA Guidelines' practical concern for efficient
function of government can devolve, when misapplied, into a
blanket exemption for environmentally sensitive projects that
happen to appear on the ballot. This loophole in the law allows
developers of potentially popular projects to use a ballot
measure to avoid or delay environmental review until well
after significant political and economic momentum has been
built through political sloganeering that tends to be long on
emotional appeal and short on objective fact. This "greasing of
the skids" turns the EIR - if and when it is finally done - into
exactly the type of "post-hoc rationalization" that the courts
have repeatedly condemned.
The application of the ballot exemption to specific
development projects is largely a product of the somewhat
murky interpretations of the guidelines found in the
surrounding case law, to which we now turn.
IV. CASELAW INTERPRETING CEQA'S BALLOT
MEASURE EXEMPTION

A. YOUNGER v. LAFCO: LIMITING THE EXEMPTION'S SCOPE
In Younger v. LAFCO, the very first case which discusses
the CEQA Guidelines' exemption for ballot measures, the Court
of Appeal remarks on the code section's "ambiguous
language.'>27 A Local Agency Formation Committee of San
Diego County ("LAFCO") had approved for a vote a proposal to

25. CEQA Guidelines, § 15378(b)(3).
26.CEQA Guidelines, § 15378(b)(5).
27. [d.
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deannex twenty-five square miles of territory In the
southwestern corner of San Diego County.28 The Court of
Appeal had to determine whether the deannexation proposal
was a "project" subject to CEQA and EIR requirements even
though that project might qualify for the ballot measure
exemption. The Younger court found that it was a project,
despite the fact that the deannexation proposal would be voted
on by the electorate. The court held that when a vote of the
people is a stage in the approval process for a project that has a
potential impact on the environment, the ballot measure
exemption does not apply.
The court explained:
the "project" here is "more than the submittal of proposals to a vote of the people." Rather, it is but the first
step. . . with consequent substantial impact on the
physical and human environment... If LAFCO disapproves the deannexation proposal, it cannot come to a
vote.
It is true the deannexation petition... is but a step in a
series of activities that mayor may not occur; but these
activit~es may culminate in a project which will change
and affect the environment.... [T]he word "project" appears to emphasize activities culminating in physical
changes to the environment . . . . In environment, directly or ultimately.29 (emphasis in original).

2B. See id. In the Younger case, the LAFCO had detennined that because the proposed deannexation "amounted to a change in governmental jurisdiction" that no EIR
was required. Younger, Bl Cal. App. 3d at 467. The state of California and the City of
San Diego both sought a writ of mandate to compel LAFCO to prepare an EIR. See id.
at 46B. It is an interesting historical note that in this seminal case on the CEQA ballot
exemption, the plaintiffs were the state and a major city - San Diego. They sought to
compel LAFCO, basically a small agency following the wishes of a citizens' group supporting the deannexation, the Border Area Citizens for Deannexation, to complete an
EIR prior to placing a project on the ballot. Subsequent history will show that many, if
not most, cities strongly support blanket CEQA exemptions for ballot measures against
the wishes of citizen groups concerned about the environmental impacts of projects
placed on the ballot.
29. Younger, Bl Cal. App. 3d at 479 (citing Bozung v. Local Agency Fonnation
Comm'n, 13 Cal. 3d 263, 279 (1975).
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The Younger court concluded that:
where there is a reasonable possibility that a project or
activity may have a significant effect on the environment, an exemption would be improper.... We conclude
a petition for deannexation is a project that does not fall
within the specified exemptions although one step in the
entire process requires submittal of the deannexation
question to the voters of the County of San Diego.3o
In Younger, the Court of Appeal recognized what should be
obvious: In cases where the electorate is called on to "approve"
projects with potentially significant environmental impacts, the
electorate deserves the benefit of the environmental analysis
that the CEQA process affords. The court wrote that an EIR
prepared prior to the vote "would be available to assist the
public in exercising its vote.'.al This sensible approach balances
the guidelines' exemption with the larger statutory and public
policy goals of CEQA analysis. This approach protects what a
number of courts have described as CEQA's dual purpose of
affording both "the fullest possible protection of the
environment,.a2 and "informed self-government.I>33 Given the
sensitive nature of the two stadium projects along San
Francisco's bayfront, "informed self-government would
certainly have benefited if an EIR had been "available to assist
the public in exercising its vote.,.a4
B. STEIN V. CITY OF SANTA MONICA: CITIZENS VERSUS AGENCY
SPONSORED INITIATIVES

In Stein v. City of Santa Monica, the Court of Appeal sought
to determine whether the city's act of placing a rent control
ordinance on the ballot in response to a citizen petition was a

30. Younger, 81 Cal. App. 3d at 479-80 (citing Wildlife Alive v. Chickering, 553
P.2d 537 (1976).
31. Younger, 81 Cal. App. 3d at 481.
32. Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors, 801 P.2d 1161, 1167 (Cal.
1990).
33. Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 764 P.2d 278,
283 (Cal. 1988).
34. Younger, 81 Cal. App. 3d at 481.
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"project" contemplated by CEQA, and therefore required
environmental review. 35 The court found that the initiative did
not become a "project" under CEQA when the city placed it on
the ballot. 36
In its discussion, the court cited CEQA language that
defines "projects" subject to CEQA's environmental
investigation to include "... discretionary projects proposed to
be carried out or approved by public agencies ..." but not "...
ministerial projects proposed to be carried out or approved by
public agencies .... "J7 The Stein court found that "the acts of
placing the issues on the ballot and certifying the result as a
charter amendment qualifies as a nondiscretionary ministerial
act not contemplated by CEQA,'.as given that the sponsors filed
a legally sound petition and the city had no choice but to certify
the petition and place it on the ballot.39
The Stein decision also cites CEQA statutory language
which defmes a project as "activities directly undertaken by
any public agency.,,40 It distinguishes between the initiative,
which it calls an "an activity undertaken by the e1ectorate,~1
and activities undertaken by a "public agency" as defined in
CEQA. 42
The Resources Agency highlighted a critical point here
when they revised the ballot exemption section of the
guidelines to include a direct citation to Stein. 43 This citation

35. See Stein v. City of Santa Monica, 110 Cal. App. 3d 458 (1980). In this case, a
group oflandlords called Santa Monica for Renters' Rights sought writ of prohibition or
mandate seeking to block the implementation and enforcement of the rent control
charter amendment. The initiative was placed on the ballot by a petition signed by
15% of registered voters and was passed as "Proposition A" by the electorate of Santa
Monica on April 10, 1979. See id.
36. See id. at 460.
37. [d.; CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21080(a), (b)(l) (West 1996).
38. Stein, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 461. See also Norwood Homes, Inc. v. Town of Moraga, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1197, 1206 (1989).
39. See Stein, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 461.
40. Stein, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 460; CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21065 (West 1996).
41. Stein, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 461.
42. See CAL. PuB. RES. Code § 21063 (West 1996).
43. See CEQA Guidelines, § 15378 (b)(4).
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must be seen as an attempt to resolve the "ambiguous
language" of the ballot measure exemption noted in the
Younger decision. 44 Why precisely did they cite to Stein? Stein
hinges on the distinction between a "non-discretionary
ministerial act not contemplated by CEQA'145 of certifying "an
activity undertaken by the electorate,146 on the one hand, and
discretionary acts by public agencies on the other. The Stein
citation in the guidelines indicates that the most reasonable
interpretation of the current guidelines is that they apply only
to non-discretionary citizen-sponsored initiatives where the city
has no choice but to put the measure on the ballot. Certainly, a
vote by the Board of Supervisors choosing to place on the ballot
a measure for a development project on environmentally
sensitive land would fall into the discretionary category in this
scheme, thus triggering CEQA review.
If the courts and public agencies had applied Stein's narrow
interpretation, the potential for abuse of the ballot measure
exemption would have been minima1.47
C. FULLERTON JOINT HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT V. STATE BOARD
OF EDUCATION: CITIZEN'S RIGHT TO ENVIRONMENTAL
INFORMATION

In Fullerton Joint Union High School District v. State Board
of Education,48 the high school district sought a writ of
mandate to prevent an election to approve the creation of a new
school district out of part of the existing district. The petition

44. See Younger, 81 Cal. App. 3d at 473.
45. Stein, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 461.
46. [d.

47. There is case law suggesting that agencies and the courts should feel bound to
Stein's limited interpretation of the ballot measure exemption, exempting only the
ministerial act of certifying for election a citizen-sponsored initiative. In Williams u.
Garcetti, the California Supreme Court held that "[wlhere changes have been introduced to a statute by amendment it must be assumed that the changes have a purpose
... [which may likely bel to clarify the true meaning of the statute." Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507, 510 (Cal. 1993) (citations omitted). What meaning could the inclusion of Stein have but to equate the ballot measure exemption with a somewhat narrow
exemption for citizen-sponsored initiatives?
48. Fullerton Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 654 P.2d 168 (Cal.
1982).
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by the Fullerton HSD argued that the state Board of Education
illegally failed to follow CEQA procedures before placing the
matter before the voters. The Superior Court found that CEQA
h~d been violated and barred the election.49 The State Board of
Education then appealed the decision.50
In the appeal, the California Supreme Court was asked to
decide whether CEQA applied to the Board of Education's
decision to place this matter before the voters.51 The Court
issued a ringing endorsement of the voters' right to
environmental analysis before voting on a proposa1. 52 The
Court wrote that the Board's decision is "not exempt from
CEQA merely because that approval must be ratified by the
voters.,,53 The decision then goes on to say:
In the present setting, the State Board and the voters
are the decision-makers; they must decide whether to
approve the proposed secession, an approval which necessarily entails building a new high school and other actions which may have an environmental effect. In making that decision, the State Board and the voters should
have the benefit of relevant environmental data and
analysis. 54
The reasoning is crystal clear. The vote by the people is a
"first step. . . with consequent substantial impact on the
environment,,55 or is "an essential step leading to
environmental impact,,,56 requiring some formal environmental
assessment before the vote. This common sense approach
acknowledges that when voters "approve" a project, the
electorate is serving a planning and decision-making function,
and has just as much right to the environmental data

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

See id. at 179-80.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Fullerton, 654 P.2d at 181.
54. [d. at 183.
55. [d. at 179-80 (citing Younger, 81 Cal. App. 3d at 479).
56. [d. at 179-80.
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represented by CEQA analysis as any other planning body.
This type of review might be especially useful in the case of
high profile, well-publicized, contentious election battles - like
those for the two San Francisco stadiums.
D. LEE V. CITY OF LOMPOC: 57 WIDENING THE EXEMPrION

So far, in the first three cases we have discussed, the courts
have taken an approach to the ballot measure exemption that
balances the exemption with the broader context of the critical
environmental analysis purpose of CEQA. The Lee court chose
a more literal and categorical interpretation of the ballot
measure exemption. This created the possibility that the ballot
measure exemption could be used as a political tool to
circumvent early CEQA analysis in favor of a pro-forma EIR,
after a voter "mandate" and political and economic momentum
had built behind the project.
As with Stein, the court in Lee was asked to determine

whether environmental review was required under CEQA
when the city council placed a ballot measure before the
electorate. 58 Unlike Stein, however, the measure put before the
electorate was not brought by a citizens' petition,59 and unlike
Stein, the court in Lee did not find that CEQA's distinction
between between a city council's ministerial duties and its
discretionary acts applied to the ballot measure exemption.so
The Lee court reasoned that the city council's discretionary
decision to place the measure on the ballot did not qualify as a

57. Lee v. City of Lompoc, 14 Cal. App. 4th 1515 (1993).
58. See Lee, 14 Cal. App. 4th at 1515. The Lompoc City Council had placed on the
ballot a project to build a shopping center and to amend its general plan and specific
plans and zoning ordinance. After the voters approved the measure, the petitioners
filed suit to set aside the election results. The trial court denied the petition and the
Court of Appeal (Second District) affirmed the lower court.
59. See Lee, 14 Cal. App. 4th at 1523. The Lee court claimed that the ballot exemption "does not distinguish between submittal of ballot measures by a public agency
from those submitted by voter initiative petitions," missing that the guidelines had
been amended to include a citation to Stein. In fact, the Lee decision mistakenly asserts that the ballot measure exemption in section 15378 "has never been amended."
[d.
60. See Lee, 14 Cal. App. 4th at 1523.
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"project" because the decision was not an "approval" within the
meaning of CEQA. 61 The court wrote that "the City Council's
resolution to place the matter on the ballot did not constitute
an "approval" under CEQA because it did not commit the
Council to a definite course of action.,,62 This line of reasoning
directly conflicts with the reasoning in Younger and Fullerton
- that CEQA applies to a ballot measure if it could eventually
culminate in a change to the environment.
The Lee court also took a very different approach to the
"informed self-government',sa aspects of CEQA that Fullerton
and Younger saw as mandating EIR analysis prior to noncitizen-sponsored measures. In fact, the Lee court seems to
denigrate the importance of the environmental issues
surrounding an EIR and the voters' interest in such issues.
The Lee decision, in fact, ends by quoting with approval the
trial court's words that theses issues "... are not the kind of
informational blockbusters which would be expected to affect
the lay voter. »64
The Lee court's rejection of requiring the CEQA process for
ballot measures placed before the electorate relies on a
somewhat convoluted and legalistic argument. The court
reasoned that CEQA:
requires the "lead agency,,s5 to certify that the final EIR
has been completed in compliance with CEQA ... and
that the decision-making body reviewed and considered
... the final EIR prior to approving the project. There is
no way a lead agency could certify that the electorate
considered the information in the EIR prior to approving the project. 66

61. See id.
62. See id.
63. Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 764 P.2d 278,
283 (Cal. 1988).
64. Lee, 14 Cal. App. 4th at 1524.
65. Lee, 14 Cal. App. 4th at 1524. "Lead agency" is defmed in CEQA Guidelines
§ 15367; see also CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21067 (West 1996).
66. Lee, 14 Cal. App. 4th at 1524.
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Therefore, because the "lead agency" has no way of going
out and determining if each voter has read and considered the
EIR in full, the Lee court would deny the electorate as a whole
the opportunity for what Fullerton called "the benefit of
relevant environmental data and analysis.'>67
Lee misses what Younger and Fullerton see clearly: the
electorate and the public agency are both decision-makers, and
the consideration of an EIR is not an either/or process.
Environmental analysis benefits the public agency in deciding
whether to "approve" the project. And it benefits the formal
"lead agency" in fully considering the project's environmental
impacts, alternatives to the project,68 and mitigation of
negative environmental impacts.69
Arguments by development project proponents and planning
agencies that both citizen-sponsored and agency-sponsored
ballot measures are exempt from CEQA prior to a vote of the
people thus rest squarely on the Lee decision. In this context it
is ironic to note that the facts of the Lee case do not lend
themselves to such a broad interpretation of Lee. In fact, in Lee
the city council had prepared an EIR on the development
project but were deadlocked on whether or not to approve the
project. The city council's inability to reach a decision caused
them to seek to resolve the impasse by placing the matter
before the voters.70 Thus, a specific case where a public agency
placed a development measure before the voters after a
certified EIR was prepared has become the main precedent for
legal arguments that no EIR process is required prior to a vote
of the people for any and all ballot measures.71

67. Fullerton, 654 P.2d at 179-180.
68. See CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21002 (West 1996); CEQA Guidelines,
§§ 15002(A)(3), 15021(A)(2), (c), 15041(a), 15063(c)(2), see also Sierra Club v. State Bd.
of Forestry, 876 P.2d 505, 516-17 (Cal. 1994).
69. See CEQA Guidelines § 15370.
70. See Lee, 14 Cal. App. 4th at 1518.
71. See Citizens for Responsible Government v. City of Albany, 56 Cal. App. 4th
1199 (1997). This recent case, handed down while this article was written, follows Lee
in precisely this way. In this case, the petitioners sought writ of mandate and declaratory relief against the city and gambling companies after passage of a ballot measure
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v.

THE STAKES OF THE GAME: ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACTS OF SAN FRANCISCO'S PROPOSED STADIUMS

In San Francisco, the Board of Supervisors placed two
measures on the ballot in 1996 and 1997 for large development
projects that· clearly would have significant environmental
impacts.
The first was Proposition B, on the ballot in March of 1996.
It contained a proposal for a 42,OOO-seat baseball stadium for
the San Francisco Giants at China Basin along with an
ancillary retail and commercial structure. The proposed site
could hardly be more environmentally sensitive - downtown
and on the waterfront. Along with the complexities of a major
development in an urban center, the city would have to take
into consideration the sensitive bayside location of the project
- including the impact on the bird and aquatic life in the Bay
and Channel area.
Proposition B amended the City Planning Code to establish
development standards for the proposed Giants ballpark at the
China Basin site. The measure also directed the city to adopt
conforming amendments to the city's General Plan and all
other relevant state, regional, and local codes and plans.72 In
addition, the measure created the Northeast China Basin
Special Use District, adopted as Section 249[18] of the City
Planning Code.
pennitting cardroom gaming at a horse track located on the waterfront. The Superior
Court dismissed the case and the Court of Appeal affinned in part and reversed in
part. Without much discussion, the case adopts Lee's blanket application of the guidelines' ballot measure exemption - even going so far as to cite Lee's mistaken contention
that the ballot measure exemption in the guidelines "has never been amended." [d. at
109 (citing Lee, 14 Cal. App. 4th at 1523). The Court of Appeal, however, in this recent
decision did hold that the ballot measure was subject to CEQA review because it in-

cluded a detailed development agreement between the city and the cardroom developers
with details about the development. See id. at 116. This is an important point because
just these types of details about how specific development projects were to be carried
out were included in the ballot measures placed before San Francisco voters. Unfortunately, the Court of Appeal failed to see that that this sort of "planning before environmental review" could take place without a legally binding development agreement.
In fact, in the case of measure F (Land Use measure for the 4gers' stadium), it was
negotiated and placed directly in the initiative rather than in the development agreement. See id.
72. San Francisco, California, Proposition B, Section 8 (June 1997 ballot).
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The second project was another proposal for a sports arena
- this one to build a new 75,000-seat 4gers football stadium at
Candlestick Point along with a 1.4 billion square feet
"MegaMall"73 shopping and entertainment complex.
This
project would again be built right on the waterfront, impacting
sensitive wildlife habitat, open space, and the Candlestick
Point Recreation Area. The project would also impact the
human environment, adding thousands of cars to the adjacent
Highway 101.
The 4gers' stadium/mall proposal was contained in two
ballot measures in San Francisco's June 1997 election?4
Proposition D included approval for the city to sell up to $100
million in lease revenue bonds to finance part of the stadium.
Proposition F was a land-use measure that created a special
district at Candlestick point for the stadium/mall
development. 75 It also included language expediting the
approval of any "permitted use" of the special district,
instructing the Planning Commission to approve all
applications that fit the guidelines contained within the ballot
language and to take final action on all applications "within 60
days of its first public hearing on the application."76
These two projects had a particularly wide range of
potential environmental impacts. The size and public nature of
the projects, along with their sensitive bayside settings, created
a particularly broad range of potential environmental impacts.
The new stadiums (and mall) could create an increase in traffic
along with potentially significant air quality impacts.
Potential impacts on aquatic ecology were implicated by the
stadiums' locations adjacent to San Francisco Bay. Industrial

73. Ironically, although the term "MegaMall" was used frequently by project opponents during the initiative campaign, the term itself was created as a positive marketing term by the Mills Corporation, one of three partners in the $200 million mall
project attached to the stadium proposal.
74. Proposition D was placed on the ballot by the San Francisco Board of Supervisors. Proposition F was placed on the ballot by the Mayor without public hearings. A
special election was called for the measures, which took place in June, 1997.
75. San Francisco, California, Proposition F Section 5, which added § 249.19 to
Part II, Chapter II of the San Francisco Municipal Code (City Planning Code).
76. SAN FRANCISCO MUNI. CODE § 249.19 (5) (1997).
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uses in the area of the China Basin ballpark led to serious toxic
remediation issues that had to be dealt with. Finally, the fact
that the proposed location for each stadium was right on the
Bay created potentially significant impacts on open space and
recreational use of the land.

A.

TRAFFIC AND AIR QUALITY

Perhaps the most obvious impact of the two stadium
projects is increased traffic and traffic congestion.
For
example, a game with a capacity crowd at the proposed Giants
ballpark would generate about 18,500 auto trips with an
average trip length of 25.2 miles.77 The greatest impacts would
be felt after some or all of the approximately thirteen weekday
afternoon games each season. Between 3:30 and 4:30 p.m., the
level of service at nineteen or more of the sixty-six intersections
would deteriorate to the point of causing "excessive delays.,,78
During these periods, parking needs would also escalate,
impacting the on-street parking in surrounding neighborhoods
and businesses.
Increased traffic means, of course, increased air pollution.
The Giants ballpark project would result in increases of the two
pollutants that are precursors to "smog" or ozone pollution:
reactive organic compounds (ROG)
and nitrogen oxides
(NOx).79 The project would also result in increases in PMlO
particulate pollution.80 Both particulates and ozone have
serious health effects including increased risk of respiratory
ailments as well as an increase in premature deaths.
The Giants ballpark project· would also lead to violations of
state and federal Carbon Monoxide standards.81
The
incremental increase in Carbon Monoxide emissions caused by

77. See Giants Ballpark Draft Environmental Impact Report [hereinafter "DEIR"I,
IV at 267.
78. Giants Ballpark DEIR, IV at 144.
79. See Giants Ballpark DEIR, Figure IV.G.1 at 268. Proposed Project Vehicular
Emissions compared to Existing 3Com Park Vehicular Emissions.
80. See Giants Ballpark DEIR, IV at 267 - 270.
81. See Giants Ballpark DEIR, Table IV.G.2 at '275. Local Carbon Monoxide Concentrations.
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the project is particularly pronounced when compared to local
background air quality because game-day traffic increases lead
to low travel speeds and therefore significantly more air
pollution in the vicinity of the ballpark.82
B. LAND USE AND OPEN SPACE
The San Francisco General Plan contains prOVISIons for
Recreation and Open Space as a central element in guiding the
land use policies for San Francisco.sa Key portions of it would
seem to preclude a development of the size, scope and nature of
the Giants' proposed ballpark.
The General Plan calls for a "citywide system of high quality
public open space.,,s4 It also calls for "continuous public open
space along the shoreline unless public access clearly conflicts
with . . . uses requiring a waterfront location.,,s5 The Plan
further states that "industry or commercial uses that are not
dependent upon use ofthe water should not be permitted."s6
The General Plan also includes specific provisions for open
space development at specific locations. The policy for the
creation of a South Beach Small Boat Harbor and Park calls for
the development of a "six or seven acre public park and small
boat marina east of the Embarcadero Roadway."
How do development projects such as the two proposed
stadiums penetrate such an apparent impasse of established
development guidelines? In the case of the Giants stadium,
language was placed in the ballot measure that directed the
Board of Supervisors, Planning Commission and other officials
to amend the city's General Plan and other codes and

82. See Giants Ballpark DEIR, IV at 274.
83. See Giants Ballpark DEIR, III at 3.
84. San Francisco General Plan, Recreation and Open Space Element, Objective 2,
as cited in Giants Ballpark DEIR, III at 5.
85. San Francisco General Plan, Recreation and Open Space Element, Objective 3,
as cited in Giants Ballpark DEIR, III at 5.
86. San Francisco General Plan, Recreation and Open Space Element, Objectives
2 and 3, as cited in Giants Ballpark DEIR, III at 5.
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ordinances in a manner consistent with the intent to build the
stadium expressed in Proposition B.87
As directed by the passage of Proposition B, the city's
Planning Department developed a number of amendments to
the general plan that would (1) nullify any requirements for
development projects that contradicted the proposals in
Proposition B, and (2) introduce specific enabling language and
exemptions for the Giants ballpark. This type of piecemeal
editing of a general plan to expedite a particular project is in
itself troubling. The specific amendments threaten a number
of central planning and urban design issues contained in the
general plan including: 1) the preservation of sunlight in open
spaces, 2) public access to shoreline areas, and 3) keeping
structures low along the waterfront to allow views of the Ocean
and Bay. Ironically, these amendments, arguably weakening
urban environmental guidelines, were considered and approved
as part of the "environmental review" process for the
ballpark. 88

1. Sunlight in Parks and Open Space
The Giants ballpark project would clearly violate Objective
2, Policy 3, of the Recreation and Open Space Element of the
General Plan adopted pursuant to Proposition B.
This
provision calls for:
Objective 2, Policy 3: A number of other open spaces are
under jurisdiction of other public agencies, or are privately owned and therefore not protected by the Charter
amendments. These spaces should be given other forms
of protection to assure they are not shaded during the
hours of their most intensive use. Any new shading
should be remedied to the extent feasible by expanding

87. The provision is contained in "Objective 2 Policy 3 of the Recreation and Open
Space Element of the General Plan." The amendment creating an exemption tailormade for the ballpark was contained in Proposition B, Section 8, approved by the voters of San Francisco, March, 1996.
88. Commissions OK EIR at Mayor's Urging, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, June 27,
1997, at p. AI. The amendments were approved at the same joint meeting of the Redevelopment Agency and Planning Commission certifying the EIR. See id.
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opportunities for public assembly and recreation in indoor and outdoor settings.89
2. Open Space Along the Waterfront
The Ballpark plan also clearly violates the provisions in the
Plan for public open space along the waterfront. Furthermore,
it conflicts with the proposal for a small boat harbor.
Therefore, Proposition B's mandate to amend the General Plan
to fit plans for the Ballpark includes the following:
Objective 3: A 4.8 acre shoreline park is proposed at
Rincon Point, and a 6.8 acre South Beach park is being
developed at the base of Second Street adjacent to South
Beach Harbor as part of the Rincon Point-South Beach
Redevelopment project, with appropriate transitions to
the ballpark and its overlooks. The ballpark will provide
public access along its waterfront edge and connect the
Embarcadero promenade (Herb Caen Way) with Lefty
O'Doul Bridge along China Basin.90
3. Size and Scale of Waterfront Development
Finally, the sheer bulk of the stadium conflicts with a
number of features of the Urban Design Element of the
General Plan, including an explicit 40-ft. height limit for new
buildings,91 as well as a guideline calling for low buildings
along the waterfront. As in the above cases, Proposition B
required the Planning Commission to write specific exemptions
for the ballpark into the language of the General Plan:
Objective 3, Section l.D: Low buildings along the waterfront contribute to the gradual tapering of height from
hilltops to water that is characteristic of San Francisco
and allows views of the Ocean and Bay. Larger, taller
buildings providing places of public assembly and rec-

89. Giants Ballpark DEIR, IV at 2.
90. Giants Ballpark DEIR, IV at 3.
91. Objective 3 Map 4, Urban Design Guidelines for Height of New Buildings. San
Francisco General Plan.
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reation may be appropriate along the waterfront if they
provide unique overviews or vistas that include portions
that are publicly accessible during daytime and evenings, and provide maximum feasible access to the
shoreline.92
The language in Proposition B circumventing these
principles of urban design and planning through an initiative
approving a specific development project sets a worrisome
precedent. Instead of the project being tailored to be consistent
with the city's general plan, the general plan itself was tailored
to allow a well-funded development project to go forward. Will
the city continue to allow politically expedient projects to run
roughshod over its own development guidelines?
C. TOXIC CONTAMINATION AND AQUATIC LIFE: OF HERRING AND
HEAVY METALS

The proposed location for the Giants' Ballpark had been an
industrial site for over 100 years. As a result, the land was
contaminated with toxics of multiple varieties, from coal-tar
and petroleum products to chemicals, paints, and heavy
metals. 93 Soil samples at the project site were found to contain
chemicals exceeding regulatory hazardous waste standards.94
The twelve months of construction for the project would
uncover large areas of soi1.95 Rain and water used for
construction purposes (like dust control) would fall on the soil,
washing the toxic-laden dirt into China Basin Channe1.96 The
increased turbidity of the water in the Bay could decrease
sunlight underwater, hindering photosynthesis, and introduce
concentrated toxics, potentially resulting in an increased
accumulation of toxics in the biota.97 And toxics currently
buried under the Bay floor would be churned up by the huge

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Giants Ballpark OEIR, IV at 5.
See George Cothran, Foul Play, S.F. WEEKLY, Oct 1-7,1997, at p.12.
See Giants Ballpark OEIR, IV at 298.
See Giants Ballpark OEIR, IV at 306.
See Giants Ballpark OEIR, IV at 306.
See Giants Ballpark OEIR, IV at 307.
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support columns to be driven deep into the underwater soiL98
Tidal action could move buried pollutants from the site into the
China Basin Channel and the Bay.
The EIR also points out the economic importance of the
Pacific herring (Clupea harengus pallasi), and the possibility
that toxic sediment released by construction at the site would
interfere with the herring spawning at the mouth of China
Basin by suffocating eggs laid there, and causing abnormalities
in the surviving fish.99
Had this information been made available through an EIR
performed prior to the election, the project may have seen
opposition from an entirely new sector: the fishing industry.
San Francisco's general plan contained a clear vision for the
Pier 46B area (the Ballpark site): it was to be used for "a Port
maintenance facility and other maritime uses."lOO Not only
would the Ballpark project not be a maritime use, it would
threaten an important maritime use of the entire area by
killing fish. But this posed no problem for the Giants. This
troublesome section would simply be crossed out, voided, and
replaced by specific language calling for the development of a
ballpark written right into the general plan.101
D. POST-ELECTION EIRs: A FAST-TRACK CEQA PROCESS?
As the Guide to the California Environmental Quality Act

points out:
In the more than 25 years since the enactment of
CEQA, the environmental review process has also become a means by which the public interacts with decision-makers in developing policies affecting the environment. Thus, the California Supreme Court has

98.
99.
100.
101.

George Cothran, Foul Play, S.F. WEEKLY, Oct 1-7, 1997, at p.12.
See Giants Ballpark DEIR, IV at 307.
Giants Ballpark DEIR, IV at 10.
See Giants Ballpark DEIR, IV at 10.
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stated that the CEQA process 'protects not only the environment, but informed self-government.,I02
Despite all of these potentially significant environmental
impacts, no Environmental Impact Report (and for that matter,
no formal environmental analysis) would be completed until
well after voter approval of the ballpark and stadium projects
- long after key decisions would be made about the scope of the
projects. This fact in itself undermines the informed selfgovernment function of CEQA.
Because no environmental analysis had been done, both the
Supervisors who placed the measures on the ballot and the
public who voted on them were denied the very information
that would have been required had any other "decision-making
body" been faced with the approval or disapproval of the
stadium projects were they not on the ballot.
In the case of the 4gers stadium and mall, the only
information the public received on the potential adverse affects
on air quality, traffic, and pollution was in short statements in
the ballot handbook placed by groups opposed to the project,
and in one mail piece put out by environmental groups.loa
Since the cost of placing arguments in the ballot is high and
based on a per-word charge ($200 + $2 per word in San
Francisco), the statements tended to be very short and general.
Furthermore, since no formal environmental review had been
commissioned by the city, those discussing the potentially
harmful impacts had very little data with which to work. If an
EIR had been available, its findings could have been brought
into the debate as concrete, objective data. Instead, the vast
majority of information the public received was in the form of

102. MICHAEL REMY, ET AL., GUIDE TO THE CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
ACT 2 (1996) (citing Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors, ("Goleta II") 52
Cal. 3d 553, 564 (1990)).
103. Campaign mail from the Sierra Club and the San Francisco League of Conservation Voters addressed the environmental problems associated with the stadium-mall
project. The piece urged a "Non vote on Propositions D and F because of "increased
traffic and air pollution, destruction of open space and state parkland, and habitat
destruction." This mailer was sent to 15,000 voters. (Campaign materials on file with
the authors).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1998

23

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 6

422 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vo1.28:399
campaign materials, mostly from the pro-stadium/mall
campaign, which spent more than $2 million to inundate the
electorate with glossy campaign literature, an amount
equivalent to approximately $33 a vote. 104
But the fact that the voters and the Board of Supervisors
were denied the opportunity to examine environmental data
before voting is not the only problem. Equally important, the
post-election environmental review process would face such
political momentum that post-election EIRs risked being
turned into exactly the type of "post-hoc rationalization"
disapproved of by the courts. We discuss some of the evidence
of that political momentum below.
Under CEQA, a project cannot be approved before an EIR is
completed and certified. The day after the election that
approved the 4gers stadium, even before all the votes were
counted, the city agencies responsible for certifying completion
of the EIR, the Planning Department and the Redevelopment
Agency, seemed to publicly indicate a predisposition towards
approval of the project as if the EIR were a formality.lo5

104. See Carla Marinucci & Gregory Lewis, Foes Say Team Spent $33 a Vote to
Carpet Bomb City, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, June 4, 1997, at AI. This article, published the day after the election, estimated that "the campaign ended up with barely
85,000 out of San Francisco's 411,000 registered voters." Id. The article also credited
successful appeals to women voters as helping to seal the victory. The campaign literature targeting women emphasized the "50% discount shopping" that would be available
at the new mall. One such piece queried "Why should the city support Propositiona D
and F? New jobs, new stadium, and new hope for the Bayview - And 50% off." (Campaign materials on file with authors). Of course, had an EIR been prepared prior to the
vote, project proponents could still have tried to drown out any data on negative environmental impacts with glossy mail pieces. For this reason, we suggest in the fmal
section of this article that some information on environmental impacts be placed in the
ballot handbook. The broader issue of campaign fmance is, however, beyond the scope
of this article.
105. See Gerald D. Adams, But City is Poised to Issue Approvals with Lightning
Speed, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, June 4, 1997, at A15. According to the San Francisco Examiner, "San Francisco Redevelopment Agency Director James Morales said
that, once assured the ballot measures have been approved, he will immediately redeploy staff members to work on the stadium and mall ...." Id. "It is a high priority
project," said Morales. Id. Sue Restor, attorney and urban environmental advocate
criticized the department: "Planning has become a permit-processing department that
wants to approve projects without modification." Id.
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The push for both the stadium projects took place in the
context of a very aggressive approach to planning in San
Francisco. San Francisco Mayor Willie L. Brown, Jr. - dubbed
''The Master Builder" by the local press106 - pledged to develop
"every inch of ground that is not open space.,,107 In August, two
months after the June election that contained the two 4gers
measures, the San Francisco Chronicle reported on the mayor's
tightening grip on the city's planning commission. The trouble
was, critics reported, that "the mayor seems to be the only voice
in city government when it comes to planning issues."l08 The
article also reported that planning veterans said that "checks
and balances have disappeared: If Brown wants something to
happen, city agencies that in the past would have scrutinized
projects closely now rush to see them approved. "109
An account of the hearing in which the Ballpark EIR was
approved by city agencies illustrates this point. An article by
planning writer Gerald Adams in the San Francisco Examiner
reads in part:

Sternly instructed to do so by Mayor Brown, the joint
Redevelopment Agency and Planning commissions dutifully pushed forward the San Francisco Giants' plan to
construct a China Basin ballpark. ...

106. See Rob Morse, Multifaced Mayor: A Citizen's Guide, SAN FRANCISCO Ex·
AMINER, November 9, 1997, at AI. This name stuck and appeared a number of times in
local papers. Columnist Rob Morse wrote of the "symptoms" of "Mayor Master
Builder," which he described as, "Boulevards, museums, Taj Ma City Hall, and Willigan's Island Theme Park. This is the classic case of the edifice complex, with overtones
of Paris envy." ld. Ken Garcia at San Francisco's other daily paper quipped, "Guys
like Bill Clinton want to deal with vague concepts like building a bridge to the 21st
Century. Brown doesn't care where the bridge goes. He just wants to build it." Ken
Garcia, State of City? State of Confusion, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, October 16, 1997,
at A17. For a list of the many ambitious building plans laid out in the 95 minute State
of the City address that sealed the Mayor's reputation as "Master Builder," see Matier
and Ross, Brown's Ambitious To·do List for San Francisco Carries Hefty Price Tag, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, October 17, 1997, at A19.
107. John King, Mayor's Grip on Planning Called Worrisome, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, August 8, 1997, at A17. "Mayors are known for what they build .... I
intend to cover every inch of the ground that isn't open space." ld.
108. ld.
109. ld.
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"San Franciscans normally deliberate and deliberate
and deliberate and nothing gets done. That's not the
way I operate," Brown said....
While commissioners may have been intimidated by the
mayor's words, dissidents were not. Among some 50 speakers
were critics who raised problems about traffic, parking,
encroachment on South Beach Park, sidewalks in states of
disrepair, poorly lit streets and threats to residential
neighborhood quality.
The fast-track nature of the ballpark review process is
further demonstrated by a tailored statutory exemption for the
Ballpark pushed through the state Legislature that allowed the
Giants to begin preparation of the ballpark site - including
relocation proceedings against tenants - before final approval
of the EIR. l1O This not only further called into question the
validity of the post-election ballpark EIR, but also invited an
attempt to amend the bill with a flurry of unrelated CEQA
exemptions from Republicans in the Legislature.
For proof positive that the vote had a profound effect on the
post-election environmental decision-making process, we need
look no further than the Ballpark EIR's rejection of the "No
Project" Alternative. CEQA "requires public agencies to deny
approval to a project with significant adverse effects when
feasible alternatives or feasible mitigation measures can
substantially lessen such effects." One alternative - the "No
Project" alternative - is required by CEQA to be considered in
all EIRs.111 The possibility that a project might be rejected as
too harmful to the environment is critical to the integrity of the
CEQA process.
In the terse two paragraph section labeled "Reasons for
Rejection" [of the "No Project Alternative"] the EIR reads:

110. See Steven A. Capps, Giants Ballpark Bill Passes Assembly, SAN FRANCISCO
EXAMINER, April 8, 1997, at AI. The bill passed with a lopsided vote: 71-1 in the Assembly.
111. See CEQA Guidelines, § 15126.
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The No Project Alternative would not fulfill the mandate of the voters of San Francisco in Proposition B to
construct a ballpark on a China Basin site. ll2

As with the Ballpark, the campaign for a 4gers stadium and
mall blurred the lines between private project proponents and
the city approving the project. The city's participation before
and after voter approval was spearheaded by Mayor Brown
himself. 113 It was his idea to add the mall to the stadium
complex. 114 He played a defining role in the campaign for
Propositions D and F, publicly stumping for it and encouraging
city workers to walk precincts for it. Finally, he took an active
role in shepherding the project through agencies for review,
having his office handle the project directly.ll5
This predisposition towards fast-track approval is written
directly into Proposition F, which was placed on the ballot by
the Mayor. Proposition F directed the San Francisco Planning
Commission to "approve a conditional use permit for the
stadium and mall no matter what flaws, if any, they find in the
project. It must grant approval within 60 days of its first
hearing on the projects.,,116 Normally, public hearings for such
a large project could take a year. One local paper reported that
veteran planners said they "have never known the commission
to be so constrained by a time restriction.,,117
VI.CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
In drafting the guidelines, the Resources Agency made
efforts to ensure that, wherever possible, CEQA's procedures

112. Giants Ballpark DEIR, VIII at 12.
113. See John King, Mayor's Grip on Planning Called Worrisome, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, August 8,1997, at A17. The San Francisco Mayor cultivated his mastery
of the development approval process during his years as Speaker of the Assembly when
he also worked as a development attorney. See id.
114. See Key Events in San Francisco 4gers' Bid for a New Stadium to Replace
Candlestick, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, June 4, 1997, at A14.
115. See John King, Mayor's Grip on Planning Called Worrisome, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, August 8, 1997, at A17.
116. [d.

117. [d.
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would not obstruct efficiency in government. To this end, it
allowed that "the submittal of proposals to a vote of the people"
is not to be considered a "project" as defined by CEQA, and
therefore no environmental analysis needs to be done studying
that submittal. This directive says that the purely ministerial
act by a public agency of placing a proposal on the ballot where it has no other legal option - need not trigger the CEQA
review process.
Unfortunately, this narrow advisory in the guidelines has
been misused in a way that clearly contradicts CEQA's central
requirement that EIRs should be prepared ". . . as early as
feasible in the planning process to enable environmental
considerations to influence project program and design .... "118
In cases such as the Giants Ballpark and the 4gers Stadium,
project sponsors (in reality the city and private parties
together) were able to largely avoid CEQA's requirement that
"at the earliest feasible time, project sponsors incorporate
environmental considerations into project conceptualization,
design, and planning.,,119
One remedy would be to remove the ballot measure
exemption from the CEQA Guidelines in its entirety. Even
when ballot measures are citizen-sponsored, voters should have
a right to consider environmental analysis when deciding how
to vote on an initiative. Or perhaps the exemption could be
narrowed to only exempt more general citizen-sponsored
measures,120 but not citizen-sponsored measures on specific
development projects. 121

118. CEQA Guidelines, § 15004. See also Fullerton Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v.
State Bd. Of Educ., 654 P.2d 168, 179-180 (Cal. 1982); Bozung v. Local Agency Fonnation Comm., 529 P.2d 1017 (Cal. 1975); Mount Shasta Defense Committee v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 77 Cal. App. 3d 20, 35 (1978); Stand Tall on Principles v. Shasta Union
High Sch. Dist., 235 Cal. App. 3d 772, 780 (1991).
119. CEQA Guidelines, § 15004(b)(1).
120. See Stein v. City of Santa Monica, 110 Cal. App. 3d 458 (1980).
121. A private project proponent could, of course, avoid early CEQA analysis
through an "astroturf' paid signature drive for an initiative. This misuse could be
avoided if specific development projects were barred from using the exemption.
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At the very least, the Resources Agency should amend the
guidelines122 to further clarify that the ballot measure
exemption applies only to citizen-sponsored initiatives. As we
discussed earlier, this was probably their intention in
amending the section to include a citation to Stein. The Lee
court, however, missed this amendment, underscoring the need
for clarification. Alternately, local governments could pass
resolutions and/or planning policies interpreting the guidelines'
exemption for ballot measures to apply only to citizensponsored initiatives, and requiring EIRs in cases where the
project sponsors or local governments place the measure on the
ballot.
Certainly, some initial formal environmental
assessment should be done.
The Lee court's argument, that it would be hard to confirm
that voters had considered the data, does not contradict the
usefulness of the data to the whole electorate. For example, in
San Francisco, many influential endorsing organizations would
be able to make decisions based on that data, and voters would
be able to take their recommendations into account. 123 As well,
some summary of whatever environmental analysis had
occurred could be placed in the ballot handbook, much like the
financial analysis that the handbook currently contains.
CEQA's exemption for ballot measures was not meant to
allow project proponents to make an end-run around the EIR
process. The current misuse of this exemption is undermining
the law's intent, namely, "that protection for the environment
be the guiding criterion in public decision-making."
If
corrections are not made, we are sure to see more and more
developers taking advantage of the exemption, ironically using

122. See CAL. PuB. RES. CODE 21087(a) (West 1996). The Resources Agency is now
required to "certify and adopt guidelines, and any amendments thereto, at least once
every two years." [d.
123. In addition to environmental groups - San Francisco League of Conservation
Voters, Sierra Club, and San Francisco Tomorrow - many of the dozens of Democratic
clubs have dedicated activists who would be highly likely to look at formal environmental analysis when making endorsement decisions. For example, the Harvey Milk
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Democratic Club - one of the most influential
endorsements - has an environment committee that examines just these types of issues. These organizations then distribute their recommendations via slatecards and
grassroots electioneering.
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the initiative process - originally intended to empower the
citizenry124
to undermine public participation in
environmental and land use planning.

124. The ballot initiative was a centerpiece of the Progressive Party at the turn of
the twentieth century. Envisioned as a way to allow the electorate to legislate directly,
the idea was most popular on the West Coast. California adopted the initiative process
in 1911, during Hiram Johnson's term as governor. See RANDY SHAW, THE ACTIVIST'S
HANDBOOK (Univ. of California Press, 1996), for an overview of the history of and recent campaigns around California ballot initiatives.
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